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How Partisan Identification on the
Ballot Affects Individuals' Vote
Choices
by Jennica Petersen and Rebecca Shuel

Introduction
Political parties are both praised and criticized in our society. People acknowledge
that parties serve important functions as they organize the electorate, simplify voter
choices, and help voters elect leaders that will carry out their desired policies (Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011). However, other people blame political parties for the
increasing polarization and gridlock in our government, and some people claim that
individuals rely too heavily on partisan cues and not enough on information about
political candidates when determining their vote choice. Because political parties perform such important tasks, we expect individuals to vote differently in the absence of
party cues. We use a survey experiment to assess the extent to which the indication of
candidates' partisanship on a hypothetical ballot actually affects vote choice.
We randomly assigned participants into two groups. Participants in both groups
saw a hypothetical ballot with the two hypothetical presidential candidates with certain qualifications and issue positions, but only those in the experimental group saw
the political partisanship of the candidates. We then asked the survey participants
to indicate the presidential candidate they would choose. By using the indication of
partisanship on the hypothetical ballot as the independent variable in our study, we
determined that those who identified with a particular political party voted for their
own party's candidate at a higher rate when partisanship was indicated on the ballot
compared to when it was not-even after controlling for a wide range of factors. This
experiment allowed us to isolate the independent effect of party labels on determining individuals' vote choices, which enabled us to understand to what extent individuals are influenced by party cues. We found that even when exposed to the same two
candidates, individuals change their voting behavior significantly in the presence of
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partisan cues, permitting us to infer that party labels still play a tremendous role in
our society today.

Literature Review
Party identification or an emotional or psychological attachment to a political party (Campbell et al., 1960, Goren 2005) is typically formed early in childhood
through socializing agents such as family, schools, media, and peers; however, the
family appears to be the most significant predictor of an individual's party identification Gennings and Niemi 1%8, 169). Party identification remains relatively stable
throughout an individual's life (Green and Palmquist 1994, 437, Bartels 2002, 133).
And for decades, political science research has shown party identification to be the
strongest predictor of individual vote choice (Campbell et. al 1960, Bonneau and
Cann 2013, 43) as party labels provide a readily available cue for voters to quickly differentiate between candidates (Leighley 2010, 264). Party identification is more than
a summary of individuals' political opinions; rather, it is a powerful and pervasive
influence on how they see events and interpret the world around them (Bartels 2002,
120). Party labels are quickly accessible and provide generally accurate policy information about candidates to voters. This ultimately helps voters reach reasonable decisions without having to research each individual candidate and their personal issue
positions (Schaffner, Streb, and Wright 2001, 9; Burnett and Tiede 2015, 232).
Given that voters most commonly vote for the candidates from their own party,
we might expect voters to behave differently if there were no indication of partisanship on the ballot. Previous researchers have studied local and judicial elections, most
of which are nonpartisan, to discover that when party labels are not included on the
ballot, individuals often rely on other candidate characteristics to select a candidate
(Dubois 1984, 397-398). Compared to partisan elections where voters often use party
as their main voting cue, incumbency and name recognition seem to be the major
predictor of vote choice in these nonpartisan elections (Schaffner, Streb, and Wright
2001, 7; Nelson 1978, 674). However, although researchers have found that voters rely
on elements other than party in order to choose a candidate in nonpartisan elections,
several researchers have found that voters still often bring partisan information into
nonpartisan elections. Even in nonpartisan elections, candidates often provide some
partisan indications to voters, causing voters to substitute this for a clear party label in
order to choose a candidate, rendering nonpartisan elections ineffective at actually talcing the party out of elections (Squire and Smith 1988, 169; Bonneau and Cann 2013, 43).

Our Contribution
We believe our research resolves some of the conflicting conclusions found in
previou; studies of partisan and nonpartisan elections. Although many researchers
have previously compared partisan to nonpartisan elections, their findings are limited,
because the majority of these studies have been observational in nature. This means
that previous inferences are potentially affected by factors including the differences in
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the locations of the elections, individual characteristics of the candidates, or multiple
other factors rather than an indication of the types of elections themselves. Our research
makes a unique contribution, because we take an experimental approach to compare
whether the indication of partisanship on the ballot affects individuals' voting choices,
while holding the candidates and all other factors constant. This isolates the effect of
party cues and ensures that possibly confounding variables will no longer be an issue.
We chose to model the hypothetical candidates in our experiment after lowprofile individuals with relatively moderate and generic issue positions (details will
be discussed below). This ensures that survey participants were not relying on incumbency or name recognition as a substitute for party identification, as they have shown
to do in previous judicial and nonpartisan elections (Schaffner, Streb, and Wright 2001,
7; Nelson 1978, 674). Furthermore, whereas previous researchers have focused on
local or judicial elections, we put our study into the context of a presidential election,
enabling us to extend our understanding of the role of party cues beyond the local and
judicial sphere. Although researchers have shown that individuals can typically infer
candidates' partisanship from information they divulge in their campaigns, the information we provided about the candidates was as moderate as possible to ensure that
participants would not deduce the partisanship of the hypothetical candidates without
partisan labels (details and full text of the candidates' issue positions is below). Overall,
because we conducted an experiment to hold constant the factors that other researchers
have found to influence nonpartisan elections, we determined the independent effect
of party labels in determining how individuals choose to vote.

Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
Although partisan identification strongly predicts an individual's vote, we
believe this is only the case when voters clearly know the party affiliations of the
prospective candidates. We predict that without a party label or strong party cues
(such as extremely ideological issue positions), individuals who self-identify with
any given party will not be more likely to vote for any given candidate if their issue
positions and personal qualifications seem roughly equal. However, when the candidates' party affiliations are included on the ballot, we predict that co-partisans will be
significantly more likely to vote for the candidate from their own party.

Hypothesis # 1: When there is no indication of partisanship on our hypothetical ballot,
we do not expect people who identify with a certain political party to favor one candidate
over another.
Because the candidates will have identical experience and moderate issue positions, we do not expect voters will infer candidate partisanship, when we do not include
party labels on the ballot. Because of this, we expect each survey participant to focus on
something different (i.e., personal qualifications, a certain issue position, etc.) to make
their voting decision. Thus, we do not expect to see Republicans vote more strongly for
one candidate than another or Democrats to vote more strongly for one candidate than
139
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another. Ultimately, we expect individuals' voting decisions will be based off more than
a simple party cue in our replication of a nonpartisan election. That is, because individuals assigned to the "nonpartisan election" group cannot rely on the party label as
a crutch, we expect they will take more factors about the candidates into account when
determining their voting choice. In other words, we do not expect that the party identification of individuals assigned to the control condition (the replication of a nonpartisan
election) alone will determine their vote choice; instead, we believe their vote choice will
be more complex and impossible to predict by their party identification alone.

Hypothesis # 2: When individuals know the presidential candidates' partisan identifications, we predict they will be significantly more likely to vote for the candidate that aligns
with their own personal party identification.
We hypothesize that individuals' party identification is only the major predictor of their vote choice when they clearly know the partisanship of the candidates.
In our replication of a partisan election, we believe that self-identified Democrats
will be significantly more likely to vote for the identified Democratic candidates and
self-identified Republicans will be significantly more likely to vote for the identified
Republican candidate, holding all else constant. We also believe this effect will be
especially strong for those individuals who self-classify themselves as "strong Democrats" or "strong Republicans."

Research Design
We used Amazon Mechanical Turk to perform a survey experiment of 748 adults
from across the United States. The treatment variable is the inclusion of the candidates'
partisanship on the hypothetical ballot, and we studied whether individuals who selfidentify with a political party reacted differently to the candidates in the two types of
election replications (nonpartisan and partisan). To do this, we measured each individual's party identification by having participants place themselves into one category on
the typical seven-point scale. Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a(n):
• Not so strong Republican
• Strong Republican
• Other
•Don't Know

• Strong Democrat
• Not so strong Democrat
• Independent leaning Democrat
• Independent
• Independent leaning Republican

Amazon Mechanical Turk then randomly assigned each participant into either
the control or the treatment condition. In each of the conditions, participants were
asked to read about two hypothetical candidates and then indicate the candidate they
would vote for if it were an actual presidential election.
Because we wanted to study the independent effect of party labels on determining
individuals' vote choices, the only difference between the hypothetical nonpartisan and
partisan elections was the inclusion of party labels on the ballot. We also attempted to
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make the candidates appear as moderate as possible to enable us to isolate the effect of
clear party labels on the ballot, because we did not want survey takers in the control
condition to substitute any information we gave them for a party cue. Therefore, to
make the candidates as moderate as possible, but still realistic, we used the 2013 Senate report cards from GovTrack to identify the two median U.S. Senators in the 2013
legislative session. Senators #50 and #51 on the list are Senator Susan Collins (R-ME),
and Senator Cory Booker (D-NJ). Each of the senators has the same "report card" score
of 0.39 (GovTrack 2013), but the candidates are from opposite political parties, which
meant they were the perfect models for our experiment. To create the hypothetical candidate profiles, we used these two senators' web sites to pull facts and issue positions
to create the candidate profiles for our survey. We kept the qualifications and issue positions consistent for each candidate across the control and treatment conditions (in both
conditions, candidate A is modeled after Senator Cory Booker and candidate B is modeled after Senator Susan Collins), but we only included the candidate's actual political
party in the treatment condition. Although we aimed to select moderate issue positions
for both candidates, we acknowledge that there is always a potential for bias, because
every issue has the potential to be partisan. However, even if survey participants determined the partisanship of the candidates in the control condition, making the inclusion
of party labels the only difference between the control and treatment condition ensures
that any effects we found were due to the party labels themselves, rather than an effect
driven by other factors. Ultimately, our experiment allowed us to isolate the independent effect of party labels on determining voters' choices.
The participants assigned to the control condition saw the following information
and answered the follow-up question:
Imagine that you are voting in the next presidential election. The following two
candidates are on the ballot:
Candidate A
• Currently serving a 4th term as a U.S. Senator (19 years)
• Serves on the Senate's Commerce, Science and Transportation, Small Business
and Entrepreneurship, and Environment and Public Works Committees
• Working to protect Medicare and rejects any efforts to turn it into a voucher
program
• Has worked to extend long-term unemployment insurance
• Promotes small business and entrepreneurship
CandidateB
• Has served in the U.S. Senate since 1996 (19 years)
• Currently serves as chairman of the Special Committee on Aging; and serves
on the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
• Encourages improvement of public education and promotes higher education
141

SIGMA
• Wants to cut taxes for employees and employers to incentivize business growth
• Has consistently supported programs to expand access to health care, partirularly for citizens living in rural areas
Which candidate would you personally vote for?
• Candidate A
• Candidate B
• Don't know/ no preference
The participants assigned to the experimental condition saw the following information and answered the follow-up question:
Imagine that you are voting in the next presidential election. The following two
candidates are on the ballot:
Candidate A (D)
• Currently serving a 4th term as a U.S. Senator (19 years)
• Serves on the Senate's Commerce, Science and Transportation, Small Business
and Entrepreneurship, and Environment and Public Works Committees
• Working to protect Medicare and rejects any efforts to turn it into a voucher
program
• Has worked to extend long-term unemployment insurance
• Promotes small business and entrepreneurship
Candidate B (R)
• Has served in the U.S. Senate since 19% (19 years)
• Currently serves as chairman of the Special Committee on Aging; and serves
on the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
• Encourages improvement of public education and promotes higher education
• Wants to cut taxes for employees and employers to incentivize business growth
• Has consistently supported programs to expand access to health care, particularly for citizens living in rural areas
Which candidate would you personally vote for?
• Candidate A, the Democrat
• Candidate B, the Republican
• Don't know/ no preference
As seen above, the only difference between the control and treatment conditions
was the indication of the candidates' partisanship in the treatment condition. Because
we used random assignment in the survey, this enabled us to determine that any difference between individuals' vote choices in the two groups was due to the indication
(or lack thereof) of party on the ballot.
We also controlled for demographic factors that may have influenced whether
individuals chose to vote for the candidate from their party and included these
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variables in our statistical models (details will be explained more fully below). We
asked participants to identify their likelihood of voting in the next presidential election, religion, race, age, political ideology (on a scale from extremely conservative to
extremely liberal), and gender.

Explanations of Key Variables
We wanted to test whether voters reacted differently in our replications of the
two types of elections (partisan and nonpartisan), based on the lack or presence of
party cues, even when presented with the same candidates. Therefore, while the
main independent variable in our study is the type of election that is replicated
(partisan or nonpartisan), we compared its effects across the classifications of partisans. We grouped survey takers by their self-identified political party to test how
strongly party identification on the ballot affected their vote when filtered through
their own partisan identification. Specifically, we coded individuals who identified
as either strong, weak, or independent-leaning Democrats as Democrats, and individuals who identified as either strong, weak, or independent-leaning Republicans
as Republicans. For further analysis, we also studied how our treatment affected
those who identified as strong partisans, because we expected strong partisans to
be especially loyal to the candidate from their party when presented with the candidates' party labels.
We restricted our analysis to only individuals who identified as either Republican or Democrat, because we were testing how the candidates' own partisan
identifications (Republican and Democrat) affected the vote choices of individuals
who shared their partisanship. This means we dropped all of the observations for
individuals who self-identified as "Independent," "Other," or "Don't Know" with
regard to their political party, because we only wanted to determine how party
labels affect co-partisans' vote choices. We also did this because it is impossible to
measure whether people who identified as Independents or with another political
party voted with their party, since the experiment only included a Democratic and
a Republican candidate.
Our dependent variable is whether the individuals voted for the candidate from
their own party, and it is measured with a binary variable (coded as 0/1). Specifically, if an individual identified as a Democrat (either strong, weak, or Independentleaning) and voted for the Democratic candidate (candidate A) in either the control
or treatment condition, this was coded as a 1. While if they voted for the Republican
candidate (candidate B) or indicated that they did not know who they would vote
for, this was coded as a 0. Likewise, for Republicans, those who identified as a strong,
weak, or independent-leaning Republican were coded as a 1 for the dependent variable if they voted for the Republican candidate (candidate B) in either condition, and
coded as a 0 if they voted for the Democratic candidate or indicated that they did not
know who they would vote for.
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Results
As previously stated, we only analyzed the results for individuals who identified
as either Democrats or Republicans. However, even after excluding individuals who
identified as Independents, another party, or did not know which party they identified
with, we had 583 observations, which was more than enough to draw firm conclusions.
As expected, we found that individuals were more likely to vote along party
lines when they knew the party affiliations of the candidates than when they did not.
The figure below shows the predicted probability (measured as a proportion) that
individuals in the two groups chose to vote for the candidate from their party.

Figure 1: Predicted Probability of Voting with Party, with 95%
Confidence Intervals

I

I

0
1
Treatment (O = Control, 1 = Treatment)

Figure 1 illustrates that when individuals did not know the partisanship of the
candidates, their likelihood of choosing the candidate from their own party was 43.9
percent. However, when they did know the candidates' partisanship, this probability
increased to 69.5 percent, a large increase of approximately 26 percentage points.
After finding these significant results, we also wondered whether this strong
association between party labels and vote choice could be driven by other factors.
To test for this, we first ran a logit regression including other independent variables
of interest, because the dependent variable in our study (whether individuals chose
to vote for the candidate from their party) is dichotomous. However, because coef144
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Table 1: Linear Probability Model: What Affected Individuals' Likelihood
of Voting with Their Party? (Dependent Variable: Voted with Party)
VARIABLES

(1)
Vote with Party

Assigned to 'Ireatment Condition

0.261**

(0.040)

Likelihood of Voting in Next Presidential Election

0.026
(0.014)

Protestant

-0.210
(0.188)

Catholic

-0.071
(0.188)

LDS

-0.352
(0.284)

Jewish

-0.300
(0.226)

Other Religion

-0.047
(0.196)

No Religious Preference

-0.158
(0.184)

Indian

0.024
(0.132)

Asian

-0.031
(0.100)

Black

0.049
(0.116)

Latino

-0.067
(0.105)

White

0.025
(0.097)

Islander

0.047
(0.350)

Male

0.072
(0.043)

Age

0.003
(0.002)

Education

0.010
(0.023)
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Income

--0.007
(0.015)

Ideology

--0.012
(0.020)

Constant

0.281
(0.250)

Number of Observations

583

R-squared

0.099

•• p<0.01

ficients from logit regressions are difficult to interpret, we developed a linear probability model because the coefficients can be interpreted directly. Because the linear
probability model yielded almost identical results to the logit regression in this case,
we include the results from the linear probability model in Table 1 (results from the
logit regression can be found in the Appendix).
From Table 1, the only factor that was statistically significant at predicting
whether individuals chose to vote along party lines is whether individuals were
assigned to the treabnent condition (p<.01). Because this is a linear probability model,
the coefficient of .261 can be interpreted directly and indicates that when individuals were assigned to the treabnent condition, they were 26.1 percentage points more
likely to vote along party lines, compared to those in the control condition-even
after controlling for individuals' religion, race, gender, age, education, income, and
ideology. This is a significant increase on the 100-point scale and indicates that voters
rely heavily on party labels in partisan elections.
After discovering these significant results, we also considered whether the
results could have been driven by some inherent differences between the participants
in the two groups. Although we used random assignment to determine whether participants were in the control or the treabnent group, we worried that the randomization may have somehow not worked as intended. To check for this, we performed
''balance tests" comparing the characteristics of the participants in the two groups.
Results are presented in Table 2.
As seen in Table 2, the p-values on almost all of the variables are large, indicating
the participants in the groups do not significantly differ from each other on most of
these factors. The only variable that has a statistically significant difference between
the groups is "No Religious Preference," where 51.1 percent of participants in the
control group indicated they had no religious preference compared to 41.5 percent of
participants indicating no religious preference in the treabnent group (p<.05). However, as shown above, this variable was not correlated with individuals' likelihood
of voting with their party, so this difference between the groups likely did not prove
detrimental to our analysis.
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Table 2: Balance Table: Did the Randomization Work?
Variable

Mean:

Mean:

Absolute

2-sided

Control

'lieatment

Value of the

p-value

Difference
between
Groups
Likelihood of Voting in

6.149

6.041

.108

.388

3.130

3.263

.133

.416

= Strongly
= Strongly

3.593

3.497

.096

.337

Education (1 = Some High

3.673

3.614

.059

.440

2.959

2.900

.060

.616

Protestant

.222

.256

.034

.337

the Next Presidential Elec-

tion (1 = Very Unlikely, 7 =
Very Likely)

Party ID (1

= Strong Demo-

crat, 7 = Strong Republican)

Ideology (1

Conservative, 5
Liberal)

School or Less, 5 = PostGraduate)

Income (1 = Under $25,000;
7 = Over $150,000)

Catholic

.174

.190

.016

.622

LOS

.007

.009

.002

.785

Jewish

.019

.025

.007

.578

Other Religion

.056

.089

.033

.127

No Religious Preference

.511

.415

.097

.019*

Indian

.022

.025

.003

.807

Asian

.133

.092

.042

.111

Black

.074

.066

.008

.719

Latino

.059

.085

.026

.226

White

.785

.797

.012

.716

Islander

.004

.003

.001

.911

Male

.585

.525

.060

.147

Age (Years)

35.528

34.022

1.506

.115

Democrat

.693

.690

.003

.944

Republican

.304

.310

.006

.867

Note: Significance is indicated at the *5% significance level.
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We also wondered whether there were heterogeneous treatment effects (that
is, whether the treatment affected self-identified Republicans differently than it
affected self-identified Democrats). To test for this, we ran two linear probability
models-each included the same independent variables that we included in our
main linear probability model (Figure 1 ), but one was restricted to self-identified
Democrats and the other was restricted to self-identified Republicans (full results
of both of these models can be found in the appendix). Again, the variable that was
the most statistically and substantively significant at predicting whether individuals chose to vote along party lines was whether they were assigned to the treatment
condition. The coefficient for Republicans was .259, and the coefficient for Democrats was .293. We wondered whether the larger coefficient for Democrats indicated
that the treatment was especially strong at increasing Democrats' likelihood of voting with their party, relative to Republicans. To test for this, we conducted a hypothesis test to determine if these coefficients were statistically significantly different
from one another. Results are shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Hypothesis Test for Difference in Treatment Effect
(Republicans vs. Democrats)
Treatment Effect

95% Confidence Interval

Republicans

.259

[.195, .323)

Democrats

.293

(.249, .337)

Pr( ITreatment Effect for Republicans I ITreatment Effect for Democrats I ) = .4011
Pr(Treatment Effect for Democrats> Treatment Effect for Republicans)= .800

The two-sided p-value is .4011 and the one-sided p-value is .800, indicating there
is no statistical difference between the treatment effect for Republicans and Democrats. This allows us to conclude that although the treatment effect appears larger
at first glance for Democrats than for Republicans, the difference is not statistically
significant, meaning we can conclude that the treatment affected members of both
parties to approximately the same degree.
However, we also wanted to discover whether the differences could simply have
been driven by a higher proportion of individuals in the control group, indicating they
did not know which candidate to choose. Individuals in both the treatment and control
group were automatically given a value of "O" for the dependent variable if they did not
choose one of the two candidates. If more people truly chose the "don't know" option in
the control condition relative to the treatment condition, this would automatically lead
to a lower proportion of individuals in the control condition voting for the candidate
from their party, because there would be more values of "O'' for the dependent variable.
To discover whether this was the case, we again ran most of the same tests, restricting
our analysis to only those participants who selected one of the two candidates.

148

PETERSEN AND SCHUEL

First, we tested the proportion of individuals who indicated they "did not know"
which candidate they would vote for in both the control and treatment conditions. In
the control condition, 59 out of the 269 participants (or 21.93 percent) said they did
not know which candidate they would vote for, but of those assigned the treatment
condition, only 52 out of the 316 participants (or 16.46 percent) were unsure who
they would vote for. We then performed a hypothesis test (or a difference-in-proportions test) to determine whether these numbers were statistically different from one
another. We found that the two-sided p-value for the difference between these proportions was .097 (with a I-sided p-value of .049). The one-sided p-value is significant
at the value of p<.05, so this indicates that participants were statistically more likely
to choose the "don't know" option in the control condition. However, the substantive
size of this effect is not large enough for us to discard our previous results. Additionally, as will be shown below, the results remain robust (even more so than previously)
when restricting the analysis to only those who selected one of the two candidates, so
we remain confident in our results.
Figure 2 shows the predicted probability that individuals would choose to vote
for the candidate from their party when excluding participants who chose the "don't
know" option for candidate choice.

Figure 2: Predicted Probability of Voting with Party; Limited to Individuals Who Selected One of the Two Candidates

Predicted Probability of Voting with Party, by Treatment
Limited to Those Who Selected One of the Two Candidates

f

I

0
1
Treatment (O = Control, 1 = Treatment)
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Figure 2 shows that for individuals who selected one of the two candidates, in
the control condition they chose the candidate from their party approximately 56.1
percent of the time, but in the treatment condition, they selected the candidate from
their party approximately 83 percent of the time. The "treatment effect" in this case
is .269, which means that being assigned to the treatment condition increased individuals' likelihood of voting for the candidate from their party by approximately 26.9
percentage points. These results are even stronger than the results we found when we
still included the individuals who chose the "don't know" option for their candidate
choice, giving us further confidence in our results.
These results remain robust when we include controls. We developed a new
linear probability model with the same variables as we included in Table 1, but we
restricted the analysis to participants who selected one of the two candidates (dropping the observations when participants said they did not know which candidate
they would vote for). Results are shown in Table 4.

Table 4: Individuals' Likelihood of Voting with their Party,
Restricted to Those Who Selected One of the Two Candidates
(Dependent Variable: Voted with Party)
VARIABLES

(1)
Vote with Party;
Coefficient
(Standard Error)

Assigned to lreatment Condition

0.269**
(0.041)

Likelihood of Voting in Next Presidential Election

0.030*
(0.014)

Protestant

-0.190
(0.185)

Catholic

-0.145
(0.185)

LDS

-0.479
(0.268)

Jewish

-0.324
(0.222)

Other Religion

-0.095
(0.193

No Religious Preference

-0.140
(0.181)

Indian

0.138
(0.145)
150
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Asian

0.021
(0.104)

Black

0.043
(0.117)

0.064

Latino

(0.116)

White

0.076
(0.101)

Islander

0.022
(0.320)

0.045

Male

(0.044)

Age

0.003
(0.002)

0.035

Education

(0.024)

Income

-0.017
(0.015)

Ideology

-0.026
(0.020)

Constant

0.338
(0.257)

Observations

473

R-squared

0.127

,.,. p<0.01, * p<0.05

Again, being assigned to the treatment condition is highly statistically significant. The coefficient of .269 indicates that individuals assigned to the condition
where they saw the party labels of the candidates were 26.9 percentage points
more likely to vote for the candidate from their party, all other factors held constant (p<.01). In this analysis, as individuals' likelihood of voting in the next presidential election increased they were also more likely to vote for the candidate
from their party (p<.05), but the coefficient of .030 is smaller than the coefficient of
.269 for being assigned to the treatment condition. Even when analyzing only the
responses for individuals who selected one of the two candidates, there remains a
strong treatment effect. Thus, indicating that the lower proportion of people voting
with their party in the control condition in the first analysis was not just a function
of more people in the control condition indicating that they did not know which
candidate they would vote for.
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We also hypothesized that the treatment effect would be stronger for those who
identified as either "strong Democrats" or "strong Republicans," because we believed
these people would be more loyal to their party when they clearly knew the partisanship of the candidates. We again limited our analysis to participants who actually
selected one of the two candidates in either condition. The results for strong Democrats are in Table 5.

Table 5: Treatment Effect for Strong Democrats (Analysis Restricted to
Only Those Who Selected One of the Two Candidates)
Group

Number of

Mean

Observations
Control

72

.554

Treabnent

70

.917

Difference Between

.363***

Groups
(Treabnent Effect)

·••p<.01

The results in Table 5 show that in the control condition, 55.4 percent of strong
Democrats selected the Democratic candidate, but in the experimental condition 91.7
percent of strong Democrats selected the Democratic candidate (meaning there was a
treatment effect of over 36 percentage points). Again, because this analysis was restricted
to only those participants who selected one of the two candidates, we can conversely see
that approximately 45 percent of strong Democrats selected the Republican candidate
in the control condition, and about 8 percent of strong Democrats selected the Republican candidate in the experimental condition. This means that voters presented with
the same candidates appear to vote differently in partisan and nonpartisan elections.
Specifically, it shows that voters may take more factors about the candidate into
account when deciding whom to vote for in nonpartisan elections, but in partisan
elections, strong partisans appear to use party labels as a substitute for these other
factors and may vote for the candidate they may not actually prefer otherwise.
Likewise, we repeated this type of analysis for self-identified strong Republicans,
again restricting our analysis to those who selected one of the two candidates. The
results are shown in Table 6.
Table 6 shows that in the control condition, approximately 85 percent of strong
Republicans chose the Republican candidate, while 100 percent of strong Republicans chose the Republican candidate in the experimental condition. The large proportion of strong Republicans who chose the Republican candidate in the control
condition makes it appear as though it is possible that even in the control condition,
strong Republicans may have determined which candidate was the Republican. We
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Table 6: Treatment Effect for Strong Republicans (Analysis Restricted to
Only Those who Selected One of the Two Candidates)
Group

Number of Observations

Mean

Control

13

.846

Treatment

17

1

Difference Between
Groups
(Treatment Effect)

.154*

"p<0.1

hypothesize that this may be because we included this candidate's belief in cutting
taxes to incentivize business growth, which is typically a Republican idea. However,
although this leads to a smaller treatment effect than any of the other treatment effects
we previously observed, this may also simply be a factor of the small number of
observations for this test (there were only 30 total strong Republicans in this analysis).
These results are significant, because the treatment effect for the treatment condition
remains highly positive. While 85 percent of self-identified strong Republicans still
voted for the Republican candidate in the control condition, 100 percent of strong
Republicans chose the Republican candidate when they knew the candidates' partisanship. Again, this indicates that voters who identify as strong partisans especially
appear to change their voting behavior when presented with party labels. While individuals may prefer the other candidate when they do not know the partisanship of
the candidates, it appears that voters may use party labels as a crutch instead of carefully considering all factors about the candidate in partisan elections.

Limitations
There are a few limitations by using Amazon Mechanical Turk. The first limitation is that those who use this web site to take surveys are not fully representative of
the general population. The types of people who take the surveys tend to be younger,
more liberal, and not as wealthy as the population of the U.S. as a whole. There also
is a concern with the validity of responses regarding survey data in general. We cannot assess the honesty of the respondents nor their motives behind taking the survey.
Additionally, although we took the candidates' issue positions from real senators' web sites, they are not real presidential candidates, and this is not an actual
election. It is possible voters would behave differently in a real election, because there
would be more cues about the candidates' partisanship even if there were no inclusion of party label on the ballot. Previous research has shown that nonpartisan elections often become partisan contests anyway, because candidates and voters provide
their own party cues despite the lack of party identification on the ballot. We do not
claim to believe that real elections would be unaffected by partisanship in nonpar153
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tisan elections, so while we believe that our results are highly valid internally, our
findings may not be as applicable in the real world.
In addition, some may question why we only analyzed how self-identified Republicans and Democrats responded to the treatment, excluding those who identified as Independents or something else. However, as previously discussed, we could only test how
the treatment affected Republicans and Democrats, because the candidates belonged to
these two parties. In addition, despite the increasing claim that Independents are on the
rise, self-identified Republicans and Democrats together continue to remain the largest
portion of the population. For example, although 748 individuals took our survey, 58.3
(or approximately 78 percent) of the participants identified at least loosely with either
of these two parties. In addition, because almost every political candidate in the United
States belongs to one of these two parties, the results are still applicable to the real world.
Therefore, despite these limitations, we conclude that this study still allows us to
determine the independent effect of how party labels affect individuals' vote choices.
While real elections have more factors at play, our experiment simplifies the process
to allow us to determine the size, strength, and direction of the effect of party identification on vote choice.

Conclusion
Overall, our results indicate that although voters frequently complain about
the increasing "gridlock" between the two parties in government and call for more
moderation, they may actually contribute to reinforcing the increasing polarization,
because they continually vote for the candidate from their own party in partisan elections. Our results show that when all is equal, it is difficult to predict which candidate
an individual will vote for when they do not know the partisanship of the candidates;
however, it becomes easier to predict their vote choice when the candidates' partisanship is labeled. This necessarily implies that although an individual may actually
prefer one candidate (and may select accordingly when party labels are absent), they
may simply vote for the candidate from their own party, without taking their true
preferences into account, when party labels are present. Ultimately, our results show
that voters (especially strong partisans) appear to rely strongly on partisan cues.
Even after controlling for a wide range of factors, individuals appear to be significantly more likely to vote for a candidate who shares their personal party identification when they clearly know the candidates' partisanship----all else being equal. Again,
although previous researchers have frequently compared partisan to nonpartisan elections through observational studies, no one has quantified the exact extent to which
party labels predict partisans' vote choices. Our analysis shows that all else being equal,
individuals display at least a 25 percentage point increase in voting for the candidate
from their party when they clearly know the candidates' partisanship, a huge increase
on the 100-point scale, and this effect is even stronger under some conditions.
Ultimately, our research enables us to understand that party labels continue to
have a pervading influence on society today. Even when individuals are presented
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with the same candidates, they are significantly more likely to vote along party lines
in partisan elections. This raises the question of whether individuals take the other
information about the candidates into account when voting in partisan elections, or
whether they simply use party labels as a crutch. While our analysis is not qualified to
answer the question of whether party-line voting is harmful or beneficial for society,
it does show that party-line voting remains rampant in partisan elections.
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APPENDIX
Table Al: Description of Independent Variables
Variable Name

Description

Assigned to Treatment

Coded as "1" if assigned to the condition where candidates' party

Condition

labels were included; "O" if assigned to condition without the can-

Likelihood of Voting

Coded in increasing levels on a 7-point scale (1 = Very Unlikely, 7

in Next Presidential

= Very Likely)

didates' party labels

Election
Protestant

Coded as "l" if survey participant identified as Protestant, "O"
otherwise

Catholic

Coded as "l" if survey participant identified as Catholic, "O" otherwise

LDS

Coded as "l" if survey participant identified as LDS, "O" otherwise

Jewish

Coded as "l" if survey participant identified as Jewish, "O" otherwise

Other Religion

Coded as "1" if survey participant identified as "Other Religion,
"O" otherwise

No Religious Prefer-

Coded as "1" if survey participant identified they had no religious

ence

preference, "O" otherwise

Indian

Coded as "l" if survey participant identified as Indian, "O" otherwise

Asian

Coded as "l" if survey participant identified as Asian, "O" otherwise

Black

Coded as "1" if survey participant identified as Black, "O" otherwise

Latino

Coded as "1" if survey participant identified as Latino, "O" otherwise

White

Coded as "l" if survey participant identified as White, "O" otherwise

Islander

Coded as "l" if survey participant identified as Islander, "O"
otherwise

Male

Coded as "l" if survey participant indicated they were male; "O"

if female
Age
Education

Coded by age (in years)
Coded by increasing level on 5-point scale (1

= Some High School

or Less; 5 = Post-Graduate)
Income

Coded by increasing level on 7-point scale (1
Over $150,000)

Ideology

Coded on 5-point scale (1
Liberal)
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= Strongly Conservative, 5 = Strongly
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Table A2: Logit Regression (Dependent Variable: Voted with Party)
VARIABLES

(1)
Voted with Party;
Coefficient
(Standard Error)

Assigned to Treatment Condition

1.130**
(0.181)

Likelihood of Voting in Next Presidential Election

0.116
(0.064)

Protestant

-1.008
(0.916)

Catholic

-0.375
(0.918)

LDS

-1.620
(1.309)

Jewish

-1.404
(1.069)

Other Religion

-0.239
(0.959)

No Religious Preference

-0.771
(0.901)
0.105

Indian

(0.600)

-0.140

Asian

(0.443)

Black

0.215
(0.514)

Latino

-0.310
(0.468)
0.109

White

(0.433)

0.210

Islander

(1.487)

Male

0.324
(0.191)

Age

O.D15
(0.008)
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Education

0.048
(0.104)

Income

-0.030
(0.067)

Ideology

-0.055
(0.087)

Constant

-0.911
(1.167)

Observations

581

•• p<0.01

Table A3: Linear Probability Model, Democrats Only
(Dependent Variable: Voted with Party)
(1)

VARIABLES

Voted with Party;
Coefficient
(Standard Error)
0.293••

Assigned to 'Ireatment Condition

(0.049)

Likelihood of Voting in Next Presidential Election

0.009
(0.017)

Protestant

-0.310
(0.192)

Catholic

-0.070
(0.191)

LDS

-0.759*
(0.385)

-0.210

Jewish

(0.231)

Other Religion

-0.043
(0.198)

No Religious Preference

-0.196
(0.184)

Indian

0.242
(0.156)

Asian

-0.089
(0.103)
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Black

0.065
(0.121)

Latino

-0.066
(0.113)

White

0.012
(0.101)

Islander

-0.143
(0.354)

Male

0.082
(0.052)
0.005*

Age

(0.002)
Education

-0.014
(0.028)

Income

-0.018
(0.018)

Ideology

0.075*
(0.033)

Constant

0.079
(0.278)

Observations

405
0.145

R-squared

*" p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table A4: Linear Probability Model, Republicans Only
(Dependent Variable: Voted with Party)
(1)

VARIABLES

Voted with Party;
Coefficient
(Standard Error)
0.259*"

Assigned to Treatment Condition

(0.071)
Likelihood of Voting in Next Presidential Election

0.038
(0.029)

Protestant

0.709*
(0.329)
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Catholic

0.771*
(0.331)

LDS

0.858*
(0.425)

Jewish
Other Religion

0.721*
(0.360)

No Religious Preference

0.782*

Indian

-0.613*
(0.259)

Asian

0.895*
(0.441)

Black

0.751
(0.505)

Latino

0.525
(0.356)

White

0.683
(0.424)

(0.333)

Islander
Male

0.075
(0.074)

Age

-0.001
(0.003)

Education

0.075
(0.043)

Income

-0.002
(0.027)

Ideology

-0.016
(0.047)

Constant

-1.386*
(0.594)
178

Observations

0.169

R-squared
**

p<0.01, * p<0.05
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